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About 90 to 95 percent of the world’s rice is produced in nations
generally classified as economically less-developed. Yet much of the
rice moving in international trade is exported by wealthier, developed
nations. Similarly, a sizeable share of world rice imports is taken
by economically-advanced countries.
Several of these developed nations which export and import rice
employ protective policies designed to shield their own rice producers
from the full force of international competition. Generally speaking,
these policies transfer income from consumers or taxpayers to rice pro-
ducers and, in doing so, stimulate output and narrow international mar-
kets available to other trading nations. Consequently, the rice policies
of developed nations are of special interest and concern to rice trad-
1/ ing nations in the less-developed world, particularly those in Asia.—
Among these Asian nations, Thailand obviously has a large stake in the
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A series of papers covering rice policy in most of the important
less developed producing and trading nations is contained in the
volume cited in (7). (The numbers in parentheses refer to similarly
numbered items in the References section at the end of this paper.)-2-
The purpose of this paper is to
core of the protective rice policies




2/ The fundamental economic aspects of (EEC).–
and discuss the economic
major developed nations;
European Economic Community
rice policies are emphasized
and not their operational details and statistics. The main purpose is
to show how these policies protect domestic rice producers and to suggest
how they may impinge upon world trade. The analytical tools are simple
economics of static partial equilibrium together with some discussion of
the economic and political setting within which the policies function.
Before turning to the rice policies of these four nations, let us
quickly look at their position in the world rice economy, table 1. First,
these four nations collectively accounted for only 7.4 percent of global
rice production in 1969-70, but 42.0 percent of world exports. The United
States produced about 1,3 percent of the world’s rice but shipped 28.7
percent of all world exports. Australia produces an almost negligible
proportion of the world’s rice but exported
in 1969-70. Japan, the major rice producer
nations, accounted for 5.7 percent of world
7.4 percent of total exports. But Japan is
1.8 percent of world trade
and consumer among developed
production in 1969-70 and
not a traditional exporter
of rice. Until quite recently, she was a major importer. The EEC both
imports and exports rice. It is a net importer, however, with long-grained
rice moving into the Community in excess of the short-grained volume which
is exported,
~/ The six-nation European Economic Community now operates under a Common
Agricultural Policy which includes rice. For the purpose of this paper
the EEC will be regarded as a single “nation”. Currently, the full
members of the EEC are France, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,




















































Japan and United States are clearly important in the global rice
economy in terms of production and trade respectively. Australia and
the EEC may appear to be unimportant. Yet changes in the rice policy
of either one of these nations can add to or detract from the strength




to reduce protection of rice growers by the liberal-
or by reduction of export subsidies or price guarantees
to markets for exporters like Thailand. Similarly
decisions to increase protection by reducing imports or by expanding sub-
sidized exports would further weaken an already-depressed international
market. Since each of these four nations is wealthy enough to afford
income transfer from one sector to another, decisions regarding rice
policy will continue to be political as well as economic.
For each of these four nations, production, trade, and price policy
for rice is generally consistent with and influenced by policies for other
food grains, principally wheat. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
analyze the entire range of food grain policies among these nations.
Attention is focussed on rice policy, but the interrelationships between
other food grains and rice should not be forgotten.
Price Comparisons
Although international price comparisons are always risky, the 1969
data in table 2 at least suggest the relative magnitudes of difference.
between farm level rice prices in the four developed nations and the whole-
sale paddy price in Thailand.Table 2:
Paddy prices in United States, Australia,
Japan, EEC. and Thailand, 1969.
U.S. Dollars per
Item Metric ton of paddy
United States (average price rec’d by farmer) $ 106.94
Australia (average return to growers) $ 69.76
EEC (Gov’t purchase price, Italy and France) $ 125.00
Japan (gov’t-guaranteedproducer price, bagged) .!) 242.82
Thailand (average wholesale price, No. 1, Bangkok) $ 57.67
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Rice Marketing Board of New South Wales-6-
The prices in the four developed
price and trade policies in behalf of
reflects the impact of a heavy export
removed. In addition, Australia, EEC, and
grained rice varieties. The United States
long-grained rice, and Thailand is a large
nations reflect the net impact of
rice growers. The Thailand price
tax which has since been mostly
Japan produce mainly short-
produces both short- and
producer and exporter of long-
grained rice. Prices naturally reflect
Notice the high supports available
these differences.
to Japanese rice producers. Inter-
mediate and lower levels of price protection are offered to EEC, U.S. , and
Australian producers. The policy mechanisms which sustain these price
levels inside the four developed nations are discussed in the following
sections.
United States
Rice policy in the United States can be summarized as a price-support,
acreage control program combined with commercial export subsidies and
confessional food aid exports. (6, 12, 13) Figure 1 illustrates the economic
framework of U.S. rice policy as it has operated recently.~’
Price supports through non-recourse loans are offered to growers at
PS provided that they abide by acreage allotments and related marketing
quotas. These allotments and
supply function, S-S, near the
cated by the arrows). In some
quotas are designed to keep the national
position desired by policy-makers (indi-
years they are tightened to restrict the
~/ No implication of elasticities or actual price levels is intended in
figure 1 or subsequent illustrations. However, the relative market
sizes, indicated along the quantity axis are approximately realistic.7
movement of S-S to the right. In other years, they are relaxed to permit
increased production. A given national acreage allotment is, of course,
continually eroded by advances in production technology which increase




based mainly on past production experience. Individual allot-
concentrated in the southern and western states, principally
Louisiana, Texas and California. Given the national supply func-
tion, S-S, and price support, PS, the amount Q3 is produced.
The curve D-D in figure 1 is the U.S. domestic demand function with
prices of related goods, income, and other factors held constant. It is
assumed to reflect demand conditions at the same marketing level as S-S
so as to avoid the complication of spanning one or more levels of market-
ing. At the price of PS, Q1 moves into domestic consumption. The balance
of the supply, Q3-Q1, is available for export and for inventory. Domestic
disappearance usually amounts to one third to one half of total supply.
The curve DX-DX is the demand for US exports at export prices below PS.
The horizontal distance between DX-DX and the vertical line at Q1 measures
the amount demanded by foreign buyers at various prices. Since the United
States supplies about 30 percent of world rice exports, it may be assumed
that this export demand is not perfectly elastic at the world price but is
4/ a negative function of price.—
4/ Even if the United States is assumed to be a
world markets on the basis of its relatively
perfect competitor on
minor role in total
production of rice, none of the essentials are changed. In fact,
they are much simpler, especially the question of setting the export
subsidy. The subsidy is then simply PS-PW, where PW is the externally
determined world price. It is also assumed here, although it is by
no means certain, that the United States would remain a rice exporter
under a free market with no special export programs.Figure 1:
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Commercial exports of rice from the United States carry an export sub-
sidy to bridge the gap between high domestic prices and lower world prices,
Pw. In figure 1, commercial exports are shown as Q2-Q1, the export subsidy
is PS-PW per ton, and area A is the total amount of subsidy paid. Approxi-
mately half of the excess supply at PS is exported commercially, mainly to
Canada, Europe, and the Republic of South Africa.
Because the United States is assumed to be able to influence the level
of world prices by changing its export volume, the establishment of the
export subsidy becomes a delicate policy issue. Figure 1 is drawn to illus-
trate a stated objective of U.S. rice policy, namely the avoidance of an
international price war over rice exports. (12) If the United States had
no price support policy for rice, point b would be the equilibrium position
for price and output in the free market. This is because the unlabeled curve
intersecting S-S at b is the total demand facing the United States at equal-
ized prices in domestic and export markets. It is the horizonal sum of D-D
plus DX-DX, the latter evaluated between the curve and Q1.
Figure 1 is then drawn on the very strong assumption that U.S. policy
makers actually do set the commercial export subsidy so that PW is the same
as with free markets. Too large an export subsidy or too aggressive a sales
campaign for commercial exports would widen the export volume measured by
Q2-Q1 and depress PW below point b. A lower export subsidy or a lower level
of commercial exports would shrink the amount measured by Q2-Q1 and PW would
rise above b. The truth of the matter in the real world may be either way
in any given year. Only empirical research with correctly measured demand
and supply elasticities could settle the issue. However, the very existence
of an export subsidy on rice suggests a downward pressure on world prices
and leads to controversy with other commercial rice exporters.10
Some of the remaining excess supply, Q3-Q2, is carried over as inven-
tory, but a large amount is exported under the U.S. food aid program, com-
monly called Public Law 480. In recent years, the bulk of P.L. 480 rice
exports have gone to Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Vietnam. A
guiding principal of the P.L. 480 program is that confessional shipments
should not replace conunercial sales for U.S. rice or conunercial sales of
other rice exporters. Although genuine efforts are made to avoid displac-
ing commercial sales, some displacement likely occurs. This displacement
has the effect of shifting DX-DX to the left for the United States and also
for other exporters. Thus, PW is probably somewhat lower than it would be
if P.L. 480 shipments were not being made, given a fixed level of commercial
exports from the United States.
The backflow of low priced imports into the higher-priced U.S. market
is prevented by a fixed tariff of 2.0 cents pound of milled rice (approxi-
mately $44 per metric ton). (14)
The protective aspect of this policy mechanism is that fluctuations in
DX-DX caused by changes in demand and/or supply schedules around the world
do not have an immediate or direct impact on the prices received by U.S. rice
farmers. Consumers in the United States pay higher-than-world prices for
rice, and U.S. taxpayers sustain costs for P.L. 480 shipments and for overall
program administration. More rice is produced in the United States than would
be true under free market conditions, although sizeable reductions in rice
output have been made recently through acreage allotment cuts. (6, 12)11
The following tabulation includes the approximate values of the quanti-
ties indicated of figure 1 for the average of 1969 and 1970 crop years in
the United States: (13)
Thousand metric tons
Item of milled rice
Domestic disappearance (Ql) 1,208
Commercial exports (Q2-Q1) 800
P, L. 480 exports plus stocks (Q3-Q2) 992+,
Total supply (Q3) 3,000
‘~Average P. L. 480 exports in 1969-70 were 968.
In summary, the U.S. rice policy protects domestic growers by means of
direct price supports, export subsidies, and confessional shipments to foreign
nations under government programs. In return, U.S. growers must abide by
acreage allotments and marketing quotas which tend to reduce the growth of
output . Consumers in the U.S. pay more for rice than under free market con-
ditions.
Australia
Rice policy in Australia is quite similar to Australian policy for many
other export cormnoditites. The main device is a higher home consumption price,
a lower export price, and an intermediate level of prices to farmers (3, 9).
As with several other farm commodities, a statutory marketing board (Rice
Marketing Board of New South Wales) controls the flow of supplies to domestic12
and export outlets and, in doing so, permits a slightly higher-than-world
price to be paid to farmers. Supply control is practiced through acreage
restriction based on access to irrigation water. The geographical con-
centration of rice production in southwestern New South Wales facilitates
both production and marketing regulation.
In figure 2, the controlled supply function is shown as S-S, its
position influenced by acreage allocations regulated by the state irriga-
tion authority (N.S,W. Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission) in
consultation with processor and marketing groups. At the pooled farm
price of PB, Q2 is produced and marketed. The marketing board regulates
the domestic supply at Q1. This supply earns a price of PD along the
domestic demand function, D-D. Thus the marketing board “gains” PD-PB
on each unit sold domestically or an amount equal to area A on the clom-
estic portion of total sales, about one third of the annual crop.
The balance of total supply (except for inventory change) is exported
through private traders at the world price, PW. This is about two thirds
of annual production and goes mainly to the United Kingdom and various
Pacific islands, Since Australia supplies only about 2 percent of world
rice exports, it is assumed here that she exerts no perceptible influence
on world prices. The marketing board sustains a “loss” of PB-PW on each
unit exported or an amount equal to area B on the export volume of Q2-Q1.
Referring to areas A and B as “gains” or “losses” by the Rice Marketing
Board is somewhat unrealistic since the final pooled price to growers for
a given crop is settled only after the returns from both domestic and13












export sales are known. To the extent that PD, PW, and especially PB are
approximately knovm in advance, the notion of “gains” and “losses” as used
here is helpful in understanding the economics of this market discrimination
scheme.
The backflow of imports into the higher-priced domestic market is
discouraged by a tariff, but some long-grained rice imports do occur j.n
small volumes. (It is assumed here that Australia would remain as a net
exporter of rice, at least in the short run, under a free trade policy.)
To the extent that area A is equal to or larger than area B, the direct
protective aspects of this two rice scheme are borne by Australian rice
consumers through higher prices. Protection from fluctuations or a long-
run decline in export prices are more limited with this type of scheme
than with a price-support and export-subsidy program. A decreased in PW
will tend to increase “losses” measured by area B. In order to maintain
PB by means of market discrimination, PD would have to be increased (assum-
ing that D-D is price inelastic). There is clearly an economic and political
limit to this practice. Consequently, PB will have to move downward in the
face of a severe or prolonged fall in PW.
The following tabulation contains approximate values of the annual
quantities indicated on figure 2 for the average of 1969 and 1970 in
Australia: (5)
Thousand metric tons
Item of milled rice
Domestic disappearance (Ql) 57
Export (Q2-Q1) 117
Total supply (Q2) 17415
In summary, Australia rice policy protects domestic producers modestly
by means of market discrimination between domestic and export outlets.
State marketing board and irrigation agencies operate the policy. In return
for some price and income protection, Australian producers are required
to abide by production restrictions through acreage and irrigation water
controls. Consumers in Australia pay higher prices for rice than under
free market conditions.
Q@!
Rice policy in Japan is just as crucial to the status of the inter-
national rice market as U.S. policy even though Japan is just slightly
more than self sufficient. This self-sufficiency in rice is a direct result
of domestic policy which (a) provides farmers with high guaranteed prices,
(b) iL_LSLlr@S a lower retail prices through a consumer subsidy, and (c) controls
rice imports. (2, 7, 10) The critical role of rice as the traditional
dietary staple in Japan lies at the heart of that nation’s rice policy. The
continuing political power of farmers and bitter memories of past food
shortages underpin today’s rice policy even in the face of mounting costs.
Thus, Japan’s successful drive for rice self-sufficiency is a mixture of
economic and political forces which have a long and complex history. (7)
Figure 3 is a simple illustration of the economics of this complicated
policy. A high level of price support, PS, is offered to Japan’s paddy
producers. At the moment, internal prices are more than twice as high as
world prices, the latter indicated on figure 3 by PW. Even with high internal16
rice prices, Japan was a net importer of rice as recently as 1967-68. But
the inexorable movement of the domestic supply function, S-S, to the right
as technology improved against a relatively static or declining domestic
demand has moved Japan into a net surplus position. National policy is
attempting to slow down this supply expansion by means of land diversion
payments to producers who shift paddy land into other uses. These efforts
are
the
suggested by the arrows in figure 3.
The farm purchase and marketing of rice in Japan is controlled by
5’ This agency buys the Food Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture.–
farm output, Q2, at the support price, PS. It regulates sales to consumers
at PD, thus sustaining a loss equal to area A in figure 3. Even with this
consumer subsidy, the amount demanded domestically, Ql, is short of the
total amount produced, Q2.
As the remarkable post-war growth of the Japanese economy has unfolded,
rice has become much less important as a wage good. (7) Consequently,
consumer rice prices have been increased relative to farm prices in recent
years, although consumers are still subsidized. However, farm price guar-
antees for rice have been increased virtually every year since 1960. This
program is quite expensive. At least 35-40 percent of the budget for agri-
cultural administration is devoted to the support program for rice. (8)
The amount Q2-Q1 in figure 3 is available for export and inventory
accumulation. Even though Japan is potentially a large importer of rice
at current world prices, her actual imports and exports currently probably
~1 Some sales of rice outside the Food Agency are legally authorized and














have little direct impact on world prices. However, any major reduction
in domestic production or domestic support prices could produce substan-
61 tial upward pressure on world trade and prices.-
As Japan moved beyond self sufficiency during the late 1960’s inven-
7’ Being sensitive to tories began to accumulate in government hands.—
potential criticism from traditional rice exporters in Asia, the Japanese
government did not attempt to dump the growing inventory on weakening
commercial markets at PW. However, some exports are now occurring as
confessional food aid shipments similar to P. L. 480 exports from the
United States. Additionally, the government is moving some rice into
feed uses and is attempting to expand industrial utilization.
The following tabulation, contains approximate values of the annual
quantities shown in figure 3 for the average of 1969 and 1970: (5, 7, 11)
Thousand metric tons
Item of milled rice
Domestic consumption (Ql) 9,950
Net export and storage (Q2-Q1) 1,316
Total Production (Q2) 11,266
Level of stocks in 1970 (not shown on figure 3) 6,500
~/ Although not shown in figure 3, any change in Japan’s rice import
policy which involves substantial imports would surely bid world
prices above PW. At price levels around the current PW. Japan
would be a large net importer.
7_/ In 1970 for example, Japan’s rice stocks were approximately equal
to the level of world rice exports. (11)19
As the leading producer and consumer of rice among developed nations,
Japan’s rice policy is critical in determining the overall size and char-
acter of international rice markets. At the moment, it appears that
Japan’s goal of self-sufficiency has been achieved at a rather high cost
to her consumers and taxpayers. Unless this policy is modified, Japan
will probably remain a minor factor in the day-to-day conduct of world
trade. But should current policies change, Japan has a great potential
ability to absorb rice imports.
European Economic Community (EEC)
As a fairly sizeable importer of long-grain rice and exporter of
short-grained rice, the EEC is important among developed nations in
world rice market. The EEC policy on rice is almost identical with




this policy include rather high internal support prices to farmers pro-
tected by variable import levies on one hand and variable export subsidies
on the other. No direct production controls or restraints are now in
force, and rice moves freely within the EEC from one country
It makes sense to divide the EEC market, into two parts




illustrates the market for short-grained rice, and part (b) illustrates
the market for long-grained rice. Look at figure 4 (a) first. The curve
SS-SS is the EEC supply function for short-grained rice, produced largely
in Italy and France; !.)S-1)S is the EEC demand function for short-grained


























(a) Short-grain (b) Long-grain21
81 The balance (QS2- rice is produced than is demanded within the EEC.–
QS1) is exported to third countries, mainly to nearby, non-EEC European
nations. The difference between PSS and the lower world price, PWS,
is made up by an export subsidy equal to PSS-PWS per ton on all shipments,
or a total amount equal to area A in figure 4 (a). The export subsidy
is subject to weekly adjustment and is designed to make EEC export rice
9/ competitive in nearby markets with rice from other sources.—
Figure 4 (a) suggests that the EEC would be a net importer of short-
grained rice at the world price level (the illustrated intersection of
DS-DS and SS-SS occurs between PSS and PWS. This would probably be true
if the EEC withdrew price guarnatees for rice but did not alter its corn
policy, since rice and corn compete for similar land and production
resources inside the EEC. (15) As a matter of policy, however, corn
and rice price supports are linked closely together in the ratio of about
1:1.5. (15) If PWS was achieved inside the EEC with corn prices also
falling to maintain the ration, it is not clear what would happen to the
community’s rice output.
Next look at figure 4 (b) which is designed to illustrate the policy
situation for long-grained rice. Here the EEC is in a net deficit posi-
tion. At the internal price support rate of PSL (higher than PSS), more
~i This particular discussion sidesteps the many complexities of target
prices, intervention prices, threshhold prices, etc. For more com-
plete description of the mechanics of EEC rice policy see (4, 15).
For this paper, PSS is simply a summary measure of internal support
at the appropriate marketing level.
9_l The EEC commission has much discretion in setting the export subsidy
for different countries of destination.22
is dem. andcd by EEC consumers 10/ ‘t],e dif- khan is produced internally.—
ference, (QL2-QL1), is imported from a number of third countries, mainly
the United States and Thailand. The level of imports is controlled by
the imposition of variable import levies which make up the difference
between PSL and the appropriate c.i.f. import price, PWL. These import
levies are calculated weekly and reflect both price and quality factors.
The goal is to make imported rice inside the EEC no cheaper than domestically-
produced rice, after quality factors are accounted for. The area B in
figure 4 (b) indicates the total revenue generated by the import levies.
The EEC internal support prices for rice are not as high as those
in Japan but still above world levels. Thus, EEC consumers pay more for
both long- and short-grained rice than with free markets. Export subsidy
losses on short-grained rice are offset by levy revenues on Iong-grained
rice imports. As with most other farm products in the EEC, growers are
not encumbered by direct output restrictions and, therefore, produce rice
in excess of amounts that would be grown under free market conditions.
The following tabulation contains approximate values of annual quan-
tities of all rice in the EEC for the average of 1969 and 1970. These
data can be partially related to the volumes indicated on figure 4: (5, 13)
10/ Obviously the price for long-grain rice affects the position of the —
demand for short-grained rice and vice versa. The diagrams in figure
4 may be viewed as an equilibrium position after all short-run simul-
taneous adjustments have occurred.23
Thousand metric tons
Item of milled rice
Total production (QS2+QL1) 659
Exports (QS2-QS1) 260
Imports (QL2-Q1l) 366
Domestic utilization (QS1+QL2) 765
Summary
The rice price and trade policies of the four developed nations dis-
cussed here display a variety of devices which insulate both producers
and consumers from the full force of international competition. Among
the exporters, the United States employs direct price supports, acreage
controls, commercial export subsidies, and confessional food aid exports.
Australia, a net exporter, utilizes a two price, market discrimination
scheme featuring higher domestic prices, lower export prices, and an
intermediate pooled price to farmers which is modestly above world price
levels. Acreage and irrigation water restrictions limit the amount pro-
duced in Australia.
Japan, the largest producer and consumer of rice among the developed
nations, protects domestic rice growers with very high guaranteed prices
and only a limited land diversion program to control output. Consumers
are subsidized to some extent and a program of special food aid exports
has recently begun. The European Economic Community, a net importer,
utilizes farm price guarantees protected by variable import levies and24






These diverse programs produce several common effects:
Prices paid to rice farmers are generally higher than they would be
in the absence of the protective programs.
Prices paid by consumers are higher and, therefore, quantities demanded
somewhat lower than without the programs.
Rice production is probably higher in the developed nations than it
11/
would be otherwise.— Consequently, exports are higher and imports
smaller.
Larger exports and smaller imports by developed nations suggest that
trade opportunities for other rice producers, like Thailand, are smaller
then they otherwise would be.
11/ An abandonment of output control programs in United States and Australia —
might offset some of the production-reducing effects of lower farm prices.25
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